Field and Human Rights Assessment

Introduction:

Since October 2023, the Gaza Strip has been experiencing one of the most severe humanitarian catastrophes in its history as a result of an unprecedented Israeli military campaign in terms of intensity and geographic scope. This campaign has led to massive waves of forced displacement affecting the vast majority of the population. Under these harsh conditions, an urgent need has emerged to document and analyze trends of internal displacement and the violations committed against displaced persons, particularly in light of the absence of effective international protection and the repeated targeting of shelters and civilian infrastructure.

This study aims to provide a monitored and well-documented analysis of internal displacement movements and the violations suffered by displaced persons during the period from January to March 2025. It is based on data issued by the Palestinian Observatory for Internal Displacement, as well as other local and international sources. The report seeks to understand displacement patterns, the nature of targeting, and local and international responses within a legal and humanitarian framework, contributing to truth-telling efforts and supporting ongoing human rights and humanitarian work aimed at protecting civilians and ensuring accountability for victims.

Methodology:

This paper adopts a monitoring and analytical approach by documenting displacement movements and violations against displaced persons during the period from 1 January to 30 March 2025. Multiple tools were used, including direct monitoring and field documentation conducted by researchers working in affected areas, as well as the collection of live testimonies from displaced individuals and local actors. These testimonies were systematically gathered to support field data. In addition, reports and data issued by local and international institutions operating in the Gaza Strip were utilized to verify findings and expand the data base.

Analysis Findings:

The quantitative indicators presented in this report are based on monthly direct monitoring carried out by the Palestinian Observatory for Internal Displacement, alongside data released by local and international actors operating in the Gaza Strip. It is important to emphasize that these figures are estimations and inherently tend to increase due to the difficulty of comprehensive documentation under complex field conditions. They are included due to their importance in building the analysis and reaching accurate findings and recommendations.

Estimates indicate the gradual return of more than 800,000 displaced persons to northern Gaza following the implementation of the ceasefire on 19 January 2025, marking a significant development in reverse displacement trends. Despite this return, violations against displaced persons continued, with more than 130 documented incidents of direct targeting against returnees. Regarding human losses, at least 420 people were killed as a result of direct attacks on shelters and displacement tents, including a large number of women and children. The number of injured exceeded 950, most of whom were wounded during attacks on locations presumed to be safe for displaced persons.

Humanitarian relief efforts were not spared from violence, as more than 10 documented incidents targeted personnel responsible for securing humanitarian assistance. Among the most repeatedly targeted locations were Al-Rashid Street and Salah Al-Din Street, both of which are key internal displacement and movement routes, posing a direct threat to civilian mobility and safety.

First: January – From Peak Displacement to the Beginning of Return

January 2025 witnessed an unprecedented peak in mass displacement as a result of intensified Israeli forced evacuation operations, carried out through direct warnings and indiscriminate shelling. Dozens of evacuation orders targeted entire residential neighborhoods, particularly in southern areas, forcing thousands of families to leave their homes under coercive conditions and without the availability of safe corridors. Violations escalated further through direct targeting of displaced persons during movement and repeated shelling of shelters, including UNRWA schools and inhabited civilian buildings located in areas classified as “safe.” Several cases of forced eviction from shelters—either through force or threats—were also recorded, leading to secondary displacement waves within the Gaza Strip.

Field analysis during this month showed that most attacks directly targeted sites known to international actors as shelters, constituting a clear violation of the Geneva Conventions and international humanitarian law. In four documented cases, buildings were directly struck despite prior warnings about the presence of civilians. A heavy concentration of violations was recorded in Khan Younis and Rafah governorates, exacerbating the suffering of displaced persons and triggering additional internal displacement toward even less safe areas, without any protection or guarantees for civilians.

Second: February – Return Waves under the Ceasefire

With the ceasefire entering into force on 19 January 2025, gradual return movements of displaced persons to their original areas began, despite extensive destruction and persistent security risks. Displaced persons were allowed to return via Al-Rashid Street and Salah Al-Din Street, encouraging more than 500,000 people to return during the first two weeks of February. Nevertheless, new displacement camps emerged in northern Gaza due to the destruction of residential neighborhoods and the loss of homes for many returnees. Despite the ceasefire, intermittent attacks continued, including targeting return convoys and temporary shelters.

Field observations indicate a clear shift in targeting patterns during February, with attacks becoming more precise and occurring during peak times, resulting in increased civilian casualties. Some strikes targeted areas surrounding shelters rather than the shelters themselves, suggesting a deliberate tactic aimed at intimidating displaced persons without provoking strong international reactions. Several shelters, including Al-Fakhoura School, were shelled multiple times during the month, reflecting blatant disregard for humanitarian considerations in the rules of engagement. Despite documentation of these violations, UNRWA and international organizations largely limited their responses to condemnatory statements without concrete measures to protect civilians or hold perpetrators accountable.

Third: March – Return to Forced Displacement

March 2025 witnessed a wide-scale escalation in military operations, marked by renewed intensive shelling and direct targeting of displaced persons and shelters. This escalation coincided with the complete closure of all border crossings throughout the month, worsening humanitarian conditions amid sharp price increases and severe shortages of food and medical supplies. New mass displacement incidents were recorded from Rafah, Beit Hanoun, and Khuza‘a, reproducing the cycle of forced displacement that has persisted since the beginning of the war.

Analysis of field data shows that March represented a turning point toward systematic escalation, with targeting focused specifically on UNRWA schools and civilian buildings converted into shelters. Damage extended beyond human losses to include the destruction of essential humanitarian infrastructure, including water, electricity, and health facilities. The full closure of crossings constituted an additional tool within the siege policy, reflecting the use of starvation as a method of warfare in blatant violation of international humanitarian law and indicating practices that may amount to genocide.

Forced Evacuation Orders Issued by the Israeli Army and Their Analysis

First: Forced Evacuation Orders – January 2025

January 2025 saw a significant escalation in official evacuation orders issued by the Israeli army, targeting wide areas of the Gaza Strip and imposing repeated forced movements on residents and displaced persons. On 1 January, two simultaneous orders were issued: the first targeted blocks (2220, 2223) in Al-Bureij Camp, including Block 1, Block 2, eastern Block 5, and Block 12, instructing residents to evacuate toward the so-called “humanitarian zone.” The second targeted northwestern Gaza City, specifically area (D3) in Jabalia and blocks 763, 762, and 761, ordering immediate evacuation toward the city center.

On 3 January at approximately 12:30 p.m., a renewed evacuation order was issued for the same Al-Bureij blocks. On 12 January, residents of Block 662 in Al-Nuseirat Camp were ordered to evacuate. On 15 January, area (D5) in Jabalia Al-Balad was targeted, with residents instructed to move toward the city center. As the ceasefire approached, a general warning was issued on 18 January advising residents to avoid northern and eastern borders, the Philadelphi Corridor, and Netzarim Axis, and reaffirming that movement from south to north remained prohibited. Further warnings followed on 21 January, cautioning against movement between southern and northern Gaza and near Israeli forces, with conditional promises of return the following week. Additional warnings prohibited access to the sea and buffer zones, maintaining bans on fishing, swimming, and diving. On 26 January, the army reiterated restrictions on returning north. On 27 January, residents were allowed to return on foot via Al-Rashid Street from 7 a.m. and by vehicles via Salah Al-Din Street from 9 a.m., warning that transporting weapons would violate the ceasefire.

Data related to January evacuation orders reveal a significant expansion in scope, covering densely populated areas in northern and central Gaza such as Al-Bureij, Al-Nuseirat, and Jabalia, resulting in mass displacement and severe humanitarian chaos. Orders were repeatedly issued for the same areas within short periods, exhausting residents and deepening suffering due to constant movement without safe destinations. The warnings were often vague, referencing general terms like “humanitarian zone” without specifying safe locations or providing real protection, leading to random displacement and heightened risk to civilians.

Confusion was further aggravated by contradictions between official military statements and field realities. Despite announcements permitting return at month’s end, warnings against approaching vast areas persisted, fostering widespread insecurity. Some warnings appeared to serve as pretexts to legitimize military strikes, as airstrikes followed shortly after evacuations in several civilian areas.

Second: Forced Evacuation Orders – February 2025

During February 2025, the Israeli army did not issue official evacuation orders, due to the ongoing ceasefire that began on 19 January 2025. Nevertheless, despite the absence of formal orders, field violations continued, including targeting areas surrounding shelters and obstructing the return of displaced persons, reflecting continued unofficial restrictions on civilian movement.

Third: Forced Evacuation Orders – March 2025

March 2025 witnessed a sharp escalation in evacuation orders, targeting large areas across the Gaza Strip and triggering repeated displacement waves. On 18 March, residents of eastern, northern, and southern areas—particularly Beit Hanoun, Khuza‘a, and Abasan Al-Kabira and Al-Jadida—were ordered to evacuate toward western Khan Younis and western Gaza City. On 20 March, movement along Salah Al-Din Street was prohibited in both directions, while north-to-south passage via Al-Rashid Street was allowed. Evacuation orders were also issued for Bani Suheila toward western Khan Younis. On 21 March, residents of Al-Salateen, Al-Karamah, and Al-Awda were ordered to evacuate toward southwestern Gaza. On 23 March, residents of Tel Al-Sultan in western Rafah were ordered to evacuate toward Al-Mawasi in Khan Younis. Further orders targeted Beit Lahia, Beit Hanoun, and Jabalia. On 26 March, evacuation orders were issued for Al-Zeitoun (east and west), Tel Al-Hawa, Sheikh Ajlin, the Old City, and southern Al-Rimal toward southern Wadi Gaza. On 29 March, residents of Abasan, Al-Qarara, and Khuza‘a were ordered to evacuate toward Al-Mawasi, and the month concluded with a 31 March order for Rafah residents—including Al-Nasr, Al-Shawka, eastern and western areas, Al-Salam, Al-Manara, and Qizan Al-Najjar—to evacuate to the same destination.

March 2025 marked an unprecedented escalation in forced evacuation policy, with orders spanning northern, central, and southern Gaza, resulting in the displacement of tens of thousands of civilians. The density and frequency of orders—often issued on consecutive days—generated panic and overwhelmed humanitarian response efforts. Contradictions and repetition were evident, with some orders targeting previously evacuated areas or directing civilians to locations previously deemed unsafe. Ambiguity surrounding destinations further compounded risks, as instructions referred only to broad areas such as “west of the city” or “Al-Mawasi of Khan Younis,” without specifying safe shelters or providing services or protection.

Fears intensified as airstrikes were recorded in areas less than 24 hours after evacuation warnings, suggesting the use of warnings as a procedural cover for targeting civilians. Restrictions on movement via Salah Al-Din Street further exacerbated the displacement crisis, forcing families to rely on the more dangerous Al-Rashid Street amid intermittent shelling.

Recommendations:

• We recommend that United Nations agencies and international humanitarian organizations operating in Gaza, such as UNRWA and OCHA, develop an early-warning displacement system based on field data and satellite imagery to anticipate displacement waves and adopt preventive measures.
• We urge the International Committee of the Red Cross, OCHA, and international humanitarian actors to secure safe humanitarian corridors, provide effective protection for displaced persons and returnees, and guarantee freedom of movement in accordance with international humanitarian law, particularly the principle of civilian protection.
• We call on the UN Human Rights Council, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, and international human rights organizations to intensify pressure on Israel to halt attacks on areas designated as safe zones and to activate international accountability mechanisms.
• We urge the UN Human Rights Council, OHCHR, the International Criminal Court, and international human rights organizations to hold the Israeli occupation accountable for grave violations against civilians and displaced persons through international accountability mechanisms and by supporting legal documentation efforts.
• We recommend that local and international media outlets and human rights research centers document violations against displaced persons through regular field reports based on survivor testimonies and direct observations and disseminate them on international platforms.
• We urge international donors and funding institutions to allocate flexible, long-term funding that reflects the protracted and repetitive nature of displacement in Gaza, expand humanitarian assistance proportionate to the scale of the crisis, ensure equitable access to aid without discrimination, and adhere to humanitarian principles.
• We recommend that UNRWA, the Ministries of Public Works and Housing, Health, and Education in Gaza, and international humanitarian organizations urgently rehabilitate temporary shelters and strengthen essential services, including health, education, water, and sanitation.
• We urge the Palestinian Authority and local bodies in Gaza to establish a centralized emergency operations room to monitor displacement and coordinate humanitarian responses, particularly in shelter, water, and sanitation.
• We recommend that the Palestinian Cabinet, relevant ministries, municipalities, and civil society organizations develop a comprehensive national plan addressing displacement and destruction in Gaza, including psychosocial support, documentation of violations, reconstruction, transitional justice, and guarantees of non-recurrence.