This report is based on examining and analyzing the field and administrative measures taken by the Israeli Occupation Forces in the Gaza Strip during the large-scale operation that began in October 2023. The report relies on:

Analyzing data, maps, and warnings issued by the Israeli Occupation Forces, including identifying areas covered by evacuation orders, targeted blocks/grids, and declared military operation zones.

Monitoring and analyzing field-reported information, including incidents affecting civilians, shelters, tents, and aid waiting points.

Tracking internal displacement movement within the Gaza Strip and monitoring displacement directions between the north, central, and southern areas, as well as changes in population density and the size of displacement تجمعات.

Using information issued by relevant official bodies, in addition to international organizations and local (civil society) institutions operating in the Gaza Strip.

Methodological note: The report maintains a clear distinction between (a) field-observed facts, (b) official warnings/orders, and (c) indicators of displacement and humanitarian need, to ensure analytical clarity and avoid mixing “measures” with “outcomes.”

Brief Contextual Background on the Gaza Strip

The Gaza Strip is a narrow coastal territory with an area of approximately 365 km², located between Israel, Egypt, and the Mediterranean Sea. It is home to around 2.2 million people, making it one of the most densely populated areas in the world. Since the unilateral Israeli disengagement on 11 September 2005, Gaza has experienced recurrent military operations that have resulted in extensive civilian casualties and severe damage to infrastructure.
On 7 October 2023, Hamas carried out a large-scale attack in the Gaza Envelope area, after which the occupation announced a major military campaign in Gaza under the name “Iron Swords.” As a result of this operation—considered the most severe in Gaza’s history—mass displacement occurred, approaching two million people, alongside movement restrictions between the north and south and the prevention of large numbers of residents from returning to their original areas.

Internal Displacement Movement During July 2025
1) The Overall Picture During the Month

Field-documented incidents during July 2025 reveal a compound pattern that both generates displacement and continuously reproduces it on a near-daily basis, driven by four main factors:

Repeated evacuation orders covering specific neighborhoods and blocks (Gaza City/Jabalia/Khan Younis/Deir al-Balah and others), without ensuring clear, stable, and safe destinations.

Repeated attacks in the vicinity of humanitarian assistance (distribution centers, aid-truck routes, and waiting points), effectively turning “seeking food” into a direct risk factor and leading to significant numbers of killed and injured.

Attacks on shelters and tents (schools, government buildings, clinics, and tents in Al-Mawasi and elsewhere), producing secondary displacement waves within areas that are supposed to function as temporary refuge.

Worsening health and food insecurity (malnutrition, deaths, and health alerts such as meningitis), pushing families into forced movement in search of basic survival conditions.

2) Displacement Directions as Reflected in Documented Incidents

From eastern Gaza / Zeitoun, Tuffah, Daraj, and the Old City toward western Gaza (Tel al-Hawa, al-Sabra, around al-Sina‘a), in waves involving tens to hundreds of families on certain days.

From northern areas toward central and southern Gaza via Al-Rashid Road, heading toward Deir al-Balah and Al-Mawasi (Khan Younis), with intermittent daily crossing movements.

Warning-linked displacement: each evacuation order typically triggered rapid movement within hours, followed in some cases by partial forced returns to previously evacuated shelters due to the absence of alternatives (e.g., families returning collectively to shelters after only a few days).

Displacement within the south itself (Khan Younis/Al-Mawasi) due to repeated attacks on tents and shelter surroundings—indicating that “displacement zones” are no longer stable or safe.

3) Patterns of Incidents Directly Shaping Displacement (Analytical Reading)

Rather than presenting each incident as a standalone line, the events can be integrated into clear “patterns”:

A. Aid distribution points and truck routes
Repeated incidents were recorded throughout the month involving attacks on civilians while waiting for aid near distribution centers or along truck routes (central Gaza/Khan Younis/Rafah/northern Gaza), resulting in varying numbers of casualties. This created displacement dynamics linked to:

avoiding aid-waiting areas,

relocating toward areas perceived as closer to food sources or less dangerous,

disruption of family daily routines (individuals leaving alone, irregular returns, and women/children remaining in increasingly crowded sites).

B. Attacks on tents and shelters
Repeated attacks targeted tents in and around Al-Mawasi, as well as schools and buildings used as shelters across Gaza, the central area, and the north. This pattern produces:

“short-range displacement” within the same area (moving the tent or relocating to relatives’ tents),

then “medium-range displacement” to other neighborhoods if attacks recur,

alongside growing pressure on western Gaza and Al-Mawasi as main gathering zones.

C. Evacuation orders (blocks/grids)
Repeated warnings covered specific blocks in Khan Younis and parts of Gaza/Jabalia, including cases where no clear destination was identified. The impact is reflected in:

rapid “surge displacement” within hours,

collective movement along overcrowded routes,

increased risks of family separation, loss of contact, or leaving behind belongings and identity documents.

D. Health and nutrition crisis indicators
Reported incidents include malnutrition-related deaths, increasing numbers of people arriving at emergency departments in severe exhaustion, and warnings of meningitis spread. These are not only “health events,” but also drivers of displacement, as families move in search of:

more reliable access to water and food,

a medical point/hospital perceived as less overcrowded,

or a site believed to have less crowding and therefore lower infection risk within shelters.

4) Indicators of Displacement Density and Space

One highly significant indicator emerges from the month’s data: the confinement of the population into extremely limited spaces relative to population size. This reflects a shift from “displacement” to a condition of crushing demographic pressure within narrow pockets—raising risks of:

infectious disease outbreaks,

gender-based violence within shelters,

water and sanitation collapse,

competition and conflict over resources (food/water/services).

Suggested Approach to Presenting the “Daily Timeline” Without Overload

Because your daily list is very long (and valuable for documentation), the best structure inside the report is:

In the main body of the report: an “analytical reading + trends + selected illustrative examples” (only 5–10 examples representing each pattern).

In an annex: the “complete daily timeline” exactly as documented, since it serves as an evidence and documentation base.

Simple Categorization Template (to Make Monthly Trends Easy to Extract)

For each incident in the annex, add just one classification label:

(A) Warning / evacuation order

(B) Attack on shelter/school/building

(C) Attack on tents

(D) Attack on aid-waiting civilians / truck route

(E) Displacement observation (number of families / direction)

(F) Health/nutrition indicator (malnutrition/disease/health alert)